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EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION IN AUSTRALIAN
CRIMINAL COURTS: A COMPLEX VARIABLE WITH
MULTIPLE EFFECTS*
LUKE McNAMARA, JULIA QUILTER, KATE SEEAR AND ROBIN ROOM**

This article reports on the second stage of a national study of how the
effects of alcohol and other drugs are treated by criminal laws and the
criminal justice system. Based on a mixed methods analysis of more than
300 appellate court decisions from all Australian jurisdictions handed
down in the period 2010–2014, we identify the multiple points at which
legal significance is attached to evidence that the accused, the victim
or a witness was ‘intoxicated’ at the time of the alleged commission of
a criminal offence. Focusing on the rules and principles endorsed by
appellate courts in relation to four key ‘sites’ of criminal justice decisionmaking — the admissibility of police interviews, the credibility and
reliability of witness testimony, adjudication on the criminal responsibility
of the accused, and determination of sentence for convicted offenders —
we show that the impact of intoxication on the enforcement of the criminal
law is complex. There is no single characterisation that can account for
the multiple points at which intoxication may need to be assessed, and
the divergent ways in which it can impact on adjudication. Depending
on a range of site-specific and case-specific considerations, intoxication
evidence may expand/contract the parameters of criminal responsibility,
and it may yield higher or lower criminal penalties.

I  INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen intense policy and law reform debates in most Australian
jurisdictions about the relevance of intoxication in the context of decisions about
criminal responsibility and punishment.1 These debates have a long history,
and the law’s normative characterisation of intoxication has moved between
mitigatory and aggravatory positions, shaped by both common law developments
*
**

1

The research on which this article reports is funded by the Australian Institute of Criminology’s
Criminology Research Grants Program 2014/15. We acknowledge the excellent research assistance
provided by Jai Clark.
Dr Luke McNamara is a Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of New South Wales. Dr
Julia Quilter is an Associate Professor in the School of Law at the University of Wollongong. Dr Kate
Seear is an ARC DECRA Fellow and Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University,
and an Adjunct Fellow in the Social Studies of Addiction Concepts research program at the National
Drug Research Institute, Curtin University. Professor Robin Room is the Director of the Centre for
Alcohol Policy Research at La Trobe University, and Professor at Stockholm University.
See Julia Quilter, ‘One-Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravating
Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International Journal for Crime, Justice and
Social Democracy 81.
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and statutory reforms. The topic of the so-called ‘defence’ of intoxication in
Australian criminal law has received considerable attention, in the journal
literature,2 and in textbooks,3 although often in a way that is largely abstracted
from specific case contexts. There is a heavy emphasis on normative discussion
of the controversial specific/general intent distinction which is central to the
rules governing the availability of the intoxication ‘defence’.4 The multiple other
ways in which intoxication evidence impacts on the administration of criminal
justice and the operation of the criminal law have been largely ignored in the
literature.5 This article represents the first attempt to illuminate how the concept
of ‘intoxication’ is given meaning in Australian appellate courts.
This article is part of a larger study of the ‘knowledges’ and assumptions about
the intoxication-violence relationship that are reflected in Australian criminal
laws.6 The study seeks to map and assess the several and diverse ways that the
effects of alcohol and other drugs (‘AOD’) are implicated in the construction
and enforcement of the criminal law, and the administration of criminal justice
generally. The larger ambition is that the generation of a more robust and nuanced
empirical foundation than has previously been available in the scholarly literature
can improve the quality and integrity of policy-making and law reform in relation
to how the criminal law might better meet the needs of the community with
2

3

4

5

6

See, eg, Andrew Hemming, ‘Banishing Evidence of Intoxication in Determining Whether a Defendant
Acted Voluntarily and Intentionally’ (2010) 29 University of Tasmania Law Review 1; A P Simester,
‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 3; Julia Tolmie, ‘Intoxication and
Criminal Liability in New South Wales: A Random Patchwork?’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal
218; Mitchell Keiter, ‘Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense’ (1997) 87
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 482; Stephen Gough, ‘Intoxication and Criminal Liability:
The Law Commission’s Proposed Reforms’ (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 335; Jeremy Horder,
‘Sobering Up? The Law Commission on Criminal Intoxication’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review
534; David McCord, ‘The English and American History of Voluntary Intoxication to Negate Mens
Rea’ (1990) 11 Journal of Legal History 372; Alan R Ward, ‘Making Some Sense of Self-Induced
Intoxication’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 247; Paul H Robinson, ‘Causing the Conditions of
One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine’ (1985) 71 Virginia
Law Review 1; Alan D Gold, ‘An Untrimmed “Beard”: The Law of Intoxication as a Defence to a
Criminal Charge’ (1976) 19 Criminal Law Quarterly 34.
See, eg, Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Reuters,
4th ed, 2017) 283–303; Thalia Anthony et al, Waller & Williams Criminal Law: Text and Cases
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 12th ed, 2013) ch 15; E Colvin, J McKechnie and J O’Leary, Criminal Law
in Queensland and Western Australia: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed,
2015) ch 18.
See, eg, Bronitt and McSherry, above n 3, 290–33; Colvin, McKechnie and O’Leary, above n 3, 450;
Anthony et al, above n 3, 994; Andreas Schloenhardt, Queensland Criminal Law (Oxford University
Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 566–7; Jeremy Gans, Modern Criminal Law of Australia (Cambridge University
Press, 2012) 153.
For an exception, see Mirko Bagaric, Ross on Crime (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2013) 833. See also
the work on intoxication and sentencing undertaken periodically by the New South Wales Judicial
Commission and the New South Wales Sentencing Council: Ivan Potas and Donna Spears, ‘Alcohol
as a Sentencing Factor: A Survey of Attitudes of Judicial Officers’ (Monograph Series No 8, Judicial
Commission of New South Wales, June 1994); New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing for
Alcohol-Related Violence’ (Report, March 2009); New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol
and Drug Fuelled Violence’ (Report, August 2015).
Julia Quilter et al, ‘New National Study Examines Intoxication in Criminal Law’ (2015) 2 Law Society
of New South Wales Journal 76; Julia Quilter et al, ‘The Definition and Significance of “Intoxication”
in Australian Criminal Law: A Case Study of Queensland’s “Safe Night Out” Legislation’ (2016)
16(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 42.
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respect to the attribution of criminal responsibility for AOD-related anti-social
behaviour, harms and risks.
The first stage of our larger study focused on the legislative approach to
intoxication, by examining the definition and significance of intoxication in
Australian criminal law statutes and regulations. We identified and analysed
more than 500 criminal law provisions that attach significance to a person’s
intoxication, for a wide variety of purposes — from enlivening a coercive police
power to influencing the sentencing process.7
This article reports on the second stage of the study, which is concerned with
illuminating judicial approaches to intoxication, with a focus on appellate courts.
Although the legislative arm of government has been more heavily involved
in the creation of criminal laws that attach significance to intoxication,8 the
judiciary remains an important part of the criminal justice system in relation
to the operation of many of these laws (in addition to relevant statutory
provisions and common law rules), as well as making assessments in relation
to the relevance of intoxication evidence. Magistrates and judges are regularly
called upon to adjudicate on the relevance that should be attached to intoxication
evidence, whether for assessing evidence admissibility or weight, the utility or
otherwise of warnings and directions, adjudicating on criminal responsibility or
deciding on the sentence to be handed down. We recognise appellate courts as an
authoritative voice of ‘knowledge’ on the nature and relevance of intoxication for
criminal law purposes, and therefore, equally deserving of scholarly attention.
Their public pronouncements are designed not only to influence future criminal
law enforcement and court room practices, but also to communicate with and
educate the wider community about the significance of alcohol and drug use for
the criminal law.
In conceiving the larger study of which this article is a part, we identified appellate
decisions in criminal cases as a fertile source of data regarding the manner in
which the criminal law concept of intoxication is interpreted and operationalised.
We recognised that the judiciary continues to play an important role in monitoring
past, and guiding future, approaches to the treatment of intoxication evidence
in criminal trials. In deciding how to ‘access’ the judicial dimension of how
intoxication is treated in Australian criminal law, we determined that a traditional
doctrinal approach to case law research, in which we limited ourselves to locating,
describing and discussing the rules contained in authoritative precedents, would
be inadequate to meet our objectives.9 We concluded that a more wide-ranging
and systematic review, across all Australian jurisdictions, would support a
valuable contribution to the literature. This article provides a snapshot of how
and where ‘intoxication’ features in higher appellate court decisions in criminal
cases. It illuminates how appellate courts approach the concept of intoxication,
7
8
9

See Julia Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs: A National Study
of the Significance of “Intoxication” in Australian Legislation’ (2016) 39 University of New South
Wales Law Journal 913.
Ibid.
Cf Catriona Cook et al, Laying Down the Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2015) ch 6.
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in criminal cases where the use of alcohol and/or other drugs form part of the
evidence before the court, and how they guide first instance trial and sentencing
courts to approach intoxication evidence.
To these ends, this article reports on the collection, categorisation and analysis
of more than 300 higher appellate court decisions in Australia, in which there
was evidence that the accused, the victim and/or a witness was intoxicated at the
time of the commission of the offence. Its primary aims are to: (i) determine how
and where intoxication evidence arises for consideration in the judicial phase
of criminal justice administration; (ii) identify the rules, practices and tests
for assessing intoxication that are endorsed and employed by appellate courts
in relation to the relevance of intoxication and how the state of ‘intoxication’
should be defined and evidenced; and (iii) assess the role that intoxication plays
in shaping the operational parameters of criminal responsibility and influencing
the nature and severity of sentences handed down.
Our chief conclusions are that: decisions about intoxication are made at multiple
points in the criminal court process; the absence of a widely understood definition
of intoxication for criminal law purposes produces a variety of approaches
to establishing whether an accused person, victim or witness was relevantly
intoxicated; and, contrary to the dominant contemporary political narrative that
adverse moral judgment should always attach to criminal offending associated
with alcohol and drug use, Australian courts recognise the complex relationship
between intoxication and criminalisation. Depending on a range of site-specific
and case-specific considerations, intoxication evidence may expand or contract
the parameters of criminal responsibility, and it may yield higher or lower
criminal penalties.

II  METHODOLOGY
We collected all decisions of the highest criminal appellate court in each state
and territory,10 and the High Court of Australia, which were handed down in a
five-year period from January 2010 to December 2014,11 in which the intoxication
of the accused, the victim or a witness formed part of the evidence in the case.
We determined that a five-year time period would yield a data-set of a sufficient
size and composition to illustrate contemporary appellate court approaches to
intoxication evidence across the range of evidentiary, substantive offence and

10

11

Australian Capital Territory Court of Appeal, New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Northern
Territory Court of Criminal Appeal, Queensland Court of Appeal, South Australian Court of Criminal
Appeal, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, Victorian Court of Appeal, Western Australian Court
of Appeal.
We note that two Australian jurisdictions made relevant changes to sentencing laws during 2014. In
New South Wales and Queensland self-induced intoxication was expressly excluded as a mitigating
factor: see New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol and Drug Fuelled Violence’, above n 5.
Because these changes occurred late in the period under review they will not be reflected in New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and Queensland Court of Appeal decisions in our data-set.
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sentencing questions identified in our pilot research — in the context of conviction
appeals, sentence appeals, and Crown appeals against sentence.
While noting that we did not set out to select a representative sample of Australian
criminal cases,12 we do acknowledge the limitations of including only higher
appellate court decisions in our data-set, in a context where the vast majority
of criminal law matters are finalised at the lower levels of the criminal court
hierarchy, without appeal to a State/Territory Court of Appeal/Court of Criminal
Appeal,13 and where most appeals from Magistrates/Local Courts are heard by
single judge intermediate courts (such as the Victorian County Court or the WA
District Court). Nonetheless, in our view, so little empirical research has been
done on how the concept of ‘intoxication’ operates in Australian criminal courts
that, even with these limitations, the study represents an important and original
contribution to the literature.
To ensure comprehensive inclusion of all publicly available judgments handed
down in the review period (whether officially reported or not), the primary
mechanism for identification of relevant cases was online searching using the
web-based open access Austlii database. Secondary searches were conducted
using LexisNexis and relevant court websites.14 We searched each of the nine
Australian jurisdictions in turn, for the identified time frame (2010–2014). Our
primary search term was ‘intoxication’, with variations employed to maximise
search accuracy.15 Search results were filtered to ensure that only criminal law
cases were included, and that all cases did, in fact, involve evidence of intoxication
in some way.16 A full list of cases is contained in Appendix A.
12

13

14
15

16

The rules governing access to appeal (whether by right or with leave) obviously influence the types of
matters that come before higher appellate courts, and it is not possible to assess whether the frequency
with which certain issues recurred in our sample is illustrative of patterns at first instance trials or
sentencing hearings. We note that the appellate court decisions we reviewed regularly summarised
extracts from jury directions, trial transcripts, expert evidence and sentencing remarks, and so, to
that extent, provide something of a ‘window’ into how intoxication evidence is addressed in lower
and intermediate courts.
Given that intoxication features in numerous criminal law statutes and given the available evidence
of the involvement of AOD use in a significant proportion of the high-volume offences in lower courts
(eg driving offences, public order offences, assaults; see Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects
of Alcohol and Other Drugs’, above n 7), how intoxication evidence plays out in this major tier of the
criminal court system will be an important topic for future research.
See, eg, the cases database available on the website of the Supreme Court of Queensland: Supreme
Court Library Queensland, (25 July 2017) CaseLaw <http://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/>.
Search terms used in combination with ‘intoxication’ included ‘victim’, ‘offence element’,
‘mitigating’, ‘aggravating’ and ‘sentencing’. Alternative search terms were used to pick up cases
where intoxication was in issue even if the word was not used in the judgment (eg ‘drugs’, ‘alcohol’
and ‘intoxicating substances’).
In a small number of criminal cases the judgment had used the word ‘intoxication’ (or a variation)
— eg in one case, to note that the accused was not intoxicated at the time — but closer review
confirmed that the case was not one in which there was any evidence of the accused, the victim or
a witness being intoxicated. Such cases were excluded from the data. A case qualified for inclusion
if it included evidence of accused/victim/witness intoxication. We did not additionally require that
intoxication was directly germane to a ground of appeal for a case to be included. One case was
included even though the accused was not intoxicated at the time of the offence in question: Bugmy v
The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 (‘Bugmy’). This decision of the High Court of Australia was included
because of its wider significance on the sentencing of intoxicated offenders, specifically Indigenous
offenders (see discussion below).
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The collected cases (n = 327) were analysed using a two-step process. The first
quantitative stage involved reading and categorising each case according to
jurisdiction, offence type,17 type of appeal (conviction, sentence or Crown appeal)
and the purpose(s) for which intoxication evidence was said to be relevant. In
relation to the purposes for which intoxication evidence was considered relevant,
we used a 12-part typology (see Figure 1). In addition to allowing us to determine
the relative frequency with which different types of intoxication inquiries were
undertaken, this exercise also allowed us to identify sub-sets of cases for the
second stage of qualitative analysis (on which we expand below).
Figure 1: Purposes of Intoxication Evidence in Criminal Cases

* Or to support proof of an element of an offence

III  QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS
Although the word ‘intoxication’ has traditionally been associated with the effects
of alcohol consumption, it is now routinely used more broadly in Australian
criminal laws to refer to the effects of alcohol and a long list of other drugs.18 We
found, however, that alcohol was the drug that was most frequently involved in
the cases we reviewed. The majority of the cases in our data-set were concerned
with intoxication by alcohol alone (220 cases or 67 per cent of the total). Cannabis
was involved in 41 cases and amphetamine/methamphetamine in only 18 cases.
34 cases involved multiple substances (usually including alcohol). Other drugs

17
18

Where the case involved multiple charges, we categorised according to the most serious charge (as
defined by maximum penalty).
See, eg, s 428A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) states: ‘“intoxication” means intoxication because
of the influence of alcohol, a drug or any other substance’, and ‘“drug” includes a drug within the
meaning of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and a poison, restricted substance or drug of
addiction within the meaning of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966’; see also Quilter et al,
‘The Definition and Significance of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Law’, above n 6, 47–8.
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featured very rarely.19 Because our methodology focused on appellate decisions,
we are unable to claim that our data-set was necessarily representative of the
frequency with which different drugs are associated with criminal charges.
However, in light of the intense media scrutiny, in recent years, of the role of
‘ice’ (crystal methamphetamine) in contributing to criminal violence,20 it is worth
noting that this category of illicit drug featured in just six per cent of cases in our
sample.21 Alcohol was 10 times more likely to be the drug involved in criminal
appeal cases that raised intoxication issues.22
Table 1 summarises the distribution of the sample of 327 cases across jurisdictions
and offence type. More than three-quarters of the cases involved serious charges
of homicide (25 per cent), non-fatal violence (27 per cent) or sexual offences (28
per cent). Only a relatively small number of cases arose out of the driving context,
and the majority of these involved serious charges where drunk (or drug) driving
had caused serious harm or death. Although worth noting, the concentration
of cases at the more serious end of the spectrum is unsurprising given that the
seriousness of the crime(s) of which a person has been convicted and/or length of
sentence are likely to influence decisions about whether to appeal.
Table 2 summarises the outcome of our categorisation of the cases according to
the 12-part typology of purposes for which intoxication evidence may be relevant.
For offender and victim intoxication respectively, Tables 3 and 4 cross-match the
quantitative data according to offence type and the purpose for which intoxication
evidence was considered.

19

20

21

22

Heroin (seven), cocaine (two), methadone (two), valium (two), oxyconton, zolpidem (‘Stilnox’),
benzodiazepine (‘Xanax’), flunitrazepam (‘Rohypnol’), LSD, venlafaxine (‘Effexor’), anabolic
steroid. Elsewhere, we have examined whether trial and appellate processes and decision-making in
relation to intoxication are sufficiently sensitive to the different effects of different drugs: Julia Quilter
and Luke McNamara, ‘The Meaning of “Intoxication” in Australian Criminal Cases: Origins and
Operation’ New Criminal Law Review (forthcoming).
See, eg, David Meddows, ‘Ice Killers: How the Toxic Drug Affects the Brain to Fuel Rage and
Violence’, The Daily Telegraph (online), 7 December 2015 <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/
news/nsw/ice-killers-how-the-toxic-drug-effects-the-brain-to-fuel-rage-and-violence/news-story/
f4b941de52807a7a811297f4b3c486f3>.
Noting that the data-set consists of appellate decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014, we
acknowledge that there may be a ‘lag’ between the increase in ice usage that has occurred in Australia
during the early 2010s (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
‘National Ice Action Strategy 2015’ (Report, 2015) 9) and the appearance of ice-related intoxication
cases in appellate courts, such that the proportion of cases where methamphetamine features may be
higher in the second half of the 2010s and the future.
For a review of the evidence on the relationship between violence, alcohol and other drugs, see Julia
Quilter et al, ‘“Intoxication” and Australian Criminal Law: Implications for Addressing Alcohol and
Other Drug-Related Harms and Risks’ (Report, Australian Institute of Criminology, forthcoming).
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Table 1: Australian Criminal Appeal Decisions Featuring Intoxication
Evidence, 2010–2014: Offence Type x Jurisdiction
ACT NSW

NT

Qld

SA

Tas

Vic

WA

HCA Total

Homicide

1

21

2

26

3

1

13

12

2

81

Sexual/Indecent
assault

1

22

3

12

6

0

17

10

0

71

Child sexual assault

0

4

0

0

3

1

4

7

0

19

Assaults

4

19

4

18

5

5

19

13

2

89

Driving harms

1

9

0

4

2

2

1

3

0

22

Property*

1

12

0

4

3

4

5

4

0

33

Drug

0

0

0

2

0

0

0

1

0

3

Other

0

2

0

3

2

0

0

2

0

9

Total

8

89

9

69

24

13

59

52

4

327

* This category includes ‘hybrid’ property/violence offences such as robbery, and property damage
offences such as arson.

Table 2: Type and Frequency of Purposes for which Intoxication Addressed
ACCUSED INTOXICATED
Intoxication during police custody/interview

n = 14

Credibility/reliability

n = 27

‘Contributing’ to offence

n = 27

Element of an offence (or to support proof of an element)

n=8

Aggravating element of an offence

n=4

To negative mens rea or support a defence

n = 66

Relevant to sentencing

n = 145

Other

n = 21

VICTIM INTOXICATED
Credibility/reliability

n = 29

Relevant to proof of non-consent (sexual assault)

n = 19

Sentencing (aggravating)

n = 20

WITNESS INTOXICATED
Credibility/reliability

n = 15

3

0

2

2

1

14

Child Sexual Assault

Assaults

Driving harm

Property

Drugs

Other

Total

* Or to support proof of an element of an offence.

2

1

Sexual Assault

3

Homicide

Interview/
police
detention

27

1

0

6

0

10

1

3

6

Credibility/
reliability

27

0

0

0

1

15

3

6

2

‘Contributed’ to
offence

8

2

0

0

2

0

0

4

0

Core element
of offence*

4

0

0

0

3

1

0

0

0

Aggravating
element

Table 3: Accused’s Intoxication: Offence Type x Purpose

66

1

1

0

0

12

1

9

42

Negative
elements/
defence

145

7

0

22

15

46

10

19

24

Sentencing

23

4

0

3

1

5

2

4

4

Other
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Table 4: Victim’s Intoxication: Offence Type x Purpose
Credibility/
reliability

Element of offence
(consent)

Sentencing

Homicide

2

0

4

Sexual Assault

21

16

10

Child Sexual Assault

2

2

4

Assaults

1

0

2

Driving harm

0

0

0

Property

2

0

1

Drugs

0

0

0

Other

0

1

0

Total

28

19

21

As anticipated, the context in which the relevance of intoxication was most
frequently considered was sentencing. The total sample (n = 327)23 included
134 appeals against convictions, 184 appeals against sentence and 45 Crown
appeals against sentence.24 Also expected was the large number of cases (66) in
which evidence of the accused’s intoxication was said to be relevant to mens rea
elements or a defence. There were also a significant number of cases in contexts
which feature less commonly in policy debates (and scholarship) on the relevance
of intoxication evidence.
In 71 cases the relevance of intoxication to the credibility and/or reliability
of a person’s testimony (whether accused, victim or witness) was in issue. In
68 instances the relevance of the intoxication of the victim was the subject of
consideration. The large majority of such cases involved sexual offences. The
approach, attitudes and guidance offered by appellate courts in these contexts will
Figure 2: Selected Sites of Intoxication Evidence in Criminal Courts

23
24

Some cases involved more than one type of appeal (eg conviction and sentence).
Sentencing appeals constitute the majority of the criminal law case-load of higher appellate courts:
see David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process of
New South Wales (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 279–80.
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be analysed in more detail below. Finally, our sample included cases in which the
court considered the admissibility of evidence gathered during police interview
with an intoxicated suspect. Although not large in number, we identified these
cases as warranting closer analysis because this ‘site’ is so rarely one that attracts
scholarly attention, and because it bears out our starting premise that assessments
about whether a person was/is intoxicated, and the significance of this ‘state’, are
made at multiple points in the administration of criminal justice.
Based on these preliminary quantitative analyses and categorisations, we
identified four ‘sites’ for closer qualitative analysis (see Figure 2), a selection
process that was influenced by a range of factors. The frequency with which they
occurred in the data-set, and their prominence in policy and law reform debates,
meant that we chose to investigate further the following two categories:
(i)

appeals from trials at which evidence of the accused’s intoxication was said
to be relevant to the accused’s guilt (or otherwise), including cases in which
the accused had raised a ‘defence’ of intoxication (going to voluntariness
or mens rea) or where intoxication evidence was considered relevant in
relation to a discrete full or partial defence (eg provocation); and

(ii)

sentence appeals (defendant or Crown) in assault and sexual assault cases,25
in which the court addressed the relevance (if any) of the defendant’s
intoxication at the time of the commission of the offence as a potential
mitigating or aggravating factor.

We also selected for closer analysis two categories of cases because the issues they
raise have been relatively invisible in debates over the criminal law significance
of intoxication:
(iii) conviction appeals in which a central issue was the admissibility of
statements made by a suspect during a police interview conducted at a time
when s/he was intoxicated; and
(iv) conviction appeals in sexual offence cases in which the intoxication of the
victim was considered in relation to her/his reliability and credibility as a
complainant and/or in relation to proof of the absence of consent.

IV   QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SITES
We have deliberately chosen four different points in the ‘sequence’ of criminal
justice decision-making as our sites for closer analysis of how intoxication
is conceived and how it influences adjudication: pre-trial police interviews;
assessments of witness credibility and reliability, specifically in sexual assault
25

We determined that reviewing all cases in our data-set that fell into these two major offence categories
(n = 179) would provide us with a sufficient sub-sample to identify jurisdictional patterns of similarity/
difference, as well as the opportunity to consider whether there was any evidence of differences in
the significance attached to offender intoxication as between non-fatal violence offences and sexual
offences.
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trials; the assessment of criminal responsibility, including the availability of
defences; and sentencing. Each of the sites could usefully be the subject of articlelength treatment — given, as we noted earlier, their relative invisibility in the
scholarly literature on intoxication and criminal law. However, it is not our aim
here to provide a comprehensive overview of the laws throughout Australia that
pertain to, respectively, police interviews, sexual assault trials, responsibility/
defences and sentencing. Such a treatment is neither feasible nor necessary, given
the aims of this article. Rather, we seek to produce novel insights about the concept
of intoxication in Australian criminal law, through the ‘side-by-side’ analysis of
four sites of criminal justice decision-making that are commonly treated in the
literature (if at all) as discrete settings where intoxication evidence may arise.26
Two key insights are generated from this approach. First, we are able to show that
definitional uncertainty regarding what is meant by ‘intoxication’ exists across
the full spectrum of criminal justice decision-making from police interviewing
to sentencing. Second, we are able to draw attention to the fact that a recurring
feature of the influence that intoxication exerts, across multiple decision-making
‘sites’, is that it is often a ‘double-edged’ sword: evidence of intoxication can both
facilitate and impede convictions, and raise and lower penalties.
In this study, we have actively resisted the familiar impulse to move swiftly
to normative proscriptions and law reform recommendations. We assert that
mapping exercises and foundational empirical analyses of the sort presented
in this article — involving the collection, presentation and analysis of original
quantitative and qualitative data on the operational concept of ‘intoxication’ —
are an essential pre-condition to sound evaluation and reform, as well as being
important contributions in their own right. We hope that our study will encourage
more detailed site-specific studies into how the conception of intoxication is
implicated in criminal court adjudication and other decision-making points in
criminal justice administration and that it can also make a useful contribution to
future policy debates and sober assessment of law reform proposals.
To summarise, the discussion that follows is designed to do two things. First,
we want to provide further (selective) detail to demonstrate the point we have
already made about the multiple decision-making instances at which criminal
courts attend to the relevance of intoxication evidence, including the challenges
posed by what is a poorly defined and understood concept. Secondly (and
relatedly), against the grain of the traditional tendency to essentialise intoxication
questions in criminal law as about exculpation (or mitigation) versus inculpation
(or aggravation) — that is, in dichotomous normative terms — we aim to
demonstrate that, in practice, intoxication plays a more complex and contingent
role in criminal case adjudication and in the ultimate determination of the
26

Brown et al, above n 24, a text with an earned reputation for unsettling casebook conventions, adopts
such an approach: 71–4 (drink spiking), 456 (police interviews), 590 (assault), 537–9, 544–54 (public
order), 707 (sexual assault), 217–22, 881–6 (intoxication ‘defence’) and 1251 (sentencing). See also
Bronitt and McSherry, above n 3: 283–303 (intoxication ‘defence’ and other defences), 687–8 (rape
and sexual assault), 688–90 (drink spiking), 906-7 (public order).
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parameters of criminal responsibility and severity of punishment. It follows that
the policy behind legislative moves to pre-empt or ‘fix’ the site-specific relevance
of intoxication can be confounded by competing considerations and interpretation
of the evidence.

A   ‘Voluntariness’ and Police Interviews
Appellate court consideration of the interviewing by police of intoxicated suspects
arises within the legal context of both the laws governing detention and police
interrogation, and the rules governing the admissibility of evidence that may have
been unfairly or improperly obtained. In the first category, some jurisdictions
have enacted legislation that expressly establishes that a person should not be
questioned while intoxicated.27 These provisions recognise that it is inappropriate
to interview a suspect while s/he is intoxicated, including because of the risk of
unfairness to an accused, but also because it may compromise the accuracy of the
fact-finding exercise. In those jurisdictions where no such legislation has been
enacted,28 the legitimacy of questioning of an intoxicated person will be assessed
according to the common law on ‘voluntariness’.29
The mere fact that a person was interviewed while intoxicated does not, however,
automatically mandate that any evidence so obtained will be excluded. Particularly
where serious crimes of violence are involved, a blanket prohibition on any and all
inculpatory evidence gathered during an interview with an intoxicated offender
may be regarded as against the interests of justice and the victim. Therefore, the
second relevant legal context relates to the judicial discretion to admit or exclude
evidence.
In those jurisdictions where the Uniform Evidence Act applies,30 for example,
s 138 provides for the exclusion of ‘improperly or illegally obtained evidence’.
Section 138(2)(a) states that an admission made during questioning is taken to
be obtained improperly where the person conducting the questioning knew or
should have known that the interview was conducted in circumstances which
were ‘likely to impair substantially the ability of the person being questioned
to respond rationally to the questioning’. In other jurisdictions, comparable

27

28

29
30

See Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423; Law Enforcement (Powers and
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 117(1)(k); Police Administration Act (NT) s 138(q)(ii); Criminal
Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas) s 4(4)(j); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23C(7)(e)
(applicable to Commonwealth offences and ACT offences that are ‘punishable by imprisonment for a
period exceeding 12 months’ (s 23A(6)).
Some jurisdictions have enacted legislation to regulate post-arrest detention and questioning without
expressly identifying intoxication as a relevant factor: Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464A; Criminal
Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 140. South Australia has a specific regime for ‘interviewing suspects
with complex communication needs’ (Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA) pt 4) but this
category expressly excludes communication difficulties caused by intoxication (cl 18(2)).
Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316, 322; McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501, 507; R v Lee
(1950) 82 CLR 133, 144; R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188, 192.
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); ACT; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act
2008 (Vic).
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legislation or the common law (or a combination of the two) operate to similar
effect.31
Although the issue of police interviewing of intoxicated suspects arose in our
data-set relatively rarely, the available evidence shows that a significant proportion
of individuals in police custody after arrest are under the influence of alcohol or
other drugs.32 Therefore, we consider that it is worth considering the guidance
offered by appellate courts on this matter, because of its potential relevance to
police practice in relation to suspects apprehended and detained by police when
intoxicated.
In NSW, express guidance is provided by the Law Enforcement (Powers and
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) regime for determining the time allowed for
questioning a suspect. Section 117(1)(k) provides that ‘any time that is required
to allow the person to recover from the effects of intoxication due to alcohol or
another drug or a combination of drugs’ is not to count for the purpose of the rules
governing the period for which a suspect may be detained for questioning.33 In
the cases we reviewed, such provisions appear to generally operate as a barrier
to questioning an intoxicated person. For example, in Adzioski v The Queen,34
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal noted that police had delayed
interviewing the suspect due to his level of intoxication, and gave him time to
recover before undertaking an electronically recorded interview with him.35
However, this was not universally so. In R v Martin,36 the Queensland Court of
Appeal considered the admissibility of a police interview with a suspect in light of
that State’s equivalent legislation on not questioning an intoxicated suspect,37 as
well as the rules governing the exercise of judicial discretion to admit evidence.38
Based on a sample taken several hours later it was estimated by a government
medical officer that the offender’s Blood Alcohol Concentration (‘BAC’) when
he was first interviewed by the police at the scene was approximately 0.311. On
appeal, the defendant argued that evidence obtained during this interview should
have been excluded for non-compliance with these provisions. The Queensland
Court of Appeal did not uphold this ground of appeal, deferring to the trial
judge’s discretion to admit the evidence. However, McMurdo P underscored the
importance of requiring police officers to comply with their obligations under the
Act:

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34KD; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 130; R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321; R v
Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10.
Sarah Coghlan et al, ‘Drug Use Monitoring in Australia: 2013–14 Report on Drug Use Among Police
Detainees’ (AIC Monitoring Report No 27, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2015).
See also Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423; Police Administration Act (NT)
s 138(q)(ii); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23C(7)(e).
[2013] NSWCCA 69 (5 April 2013).
Ibid [10]. See also Butters v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 1 (4 February 2010) [7].
[2011] QCA 342 (29 November 2011).
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 423.
R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321.
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Many judges may well have concluded that matters of public policy requiring
police officers to comply with their responsibilities under the Act warranted the
exclusion of the contentious evidence in this case, lest police officers be tempted to
flaunt the requirements of the Act by taking investigative shortcuts. Further, a jury
may place undue weight on the evidence without giving sufficient consideration
to its unreliability as evidence of the appellant’s true state of mind at the time of
the killing because of his gross intoxication at the time of the conversation. Had
the decision at first instance been mine, I would have excluded the evidence for
these reasons.
But I remain unpersuaded that the judge took into account any wrong consideration
in exercising his discretion to admit this evidence.39

In Western Australia, where no such legislation is in place,40 the common law
test of ‘voluntariness’, and the common law rules governing the admissibility
of evidence,41 appears to leave considerable scope for statements made during a
police interview to be regarded as admissible, despite evidence that the accused
was significantly intoxicated at the time of the interview. For example, in Western
Australia v Silich,42 the accused was interviewed at a time when his BAC was
estimated to be 0.116. The WA Court of Appeal observed that, ‘[h]owever, there
was no evidence as to the effect which such a level of alcohol would have had upon
the appellant’s mental faculties at the time of his interview’.43 The Court endorsed
the trial judge’s preferred approach which was to watch the police interview video
and make his own assessment as to whether the interview was ‘voluntary’; i.e.
whether Mr Silich was ‘capable of: (a) appreciating that he had a choice to speak
or remain silent, and was capable of exercising sufficient volition to give effect to
what he knew was this right; and (b) understanding the questions put to him and
what he was confessing’.44 The trial judge held that the accused was capable and
admitted the evidence. The Court of Appeal found no fault with this approach to
voluntariness and did not accept arguments that the evidence ought to have been
excluded for being unreliable or unfairly obtained.45
This example illustrates that while we have become accustomed, in the high
visibility and high-volume context of driving offences, to regard certain BAC
levels as incontrovertible ‘proof’ of (impaired) ‘intoxication’ for the purposes of
criminal responsibility and punishment, they are not determinative (and may not

39
40

41
42
43
44
45

R v Martin [2011] QCA 342 (29 November 2011) [24]–[25].
No specific legislation in relation to intoxicated suspects and police interviews has been enacted
in Western Australia, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia or the Australian Capital Territory. We
recognise that equivalent police practices may be adopted even in the absence of such legislation: see,
eg, Booth v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 38 (22 August 2014) [22]; R v Williams [2014] ACTCA 30 (18
August 2014) [7].
R v Swaffield (1988) 192 CLR 159; Van der Meer v The Queen (1988) 82 ALR 10.
(2011) 43 WAR 285.
Ibid [15].
Ibid [157].
See also WP v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 198 (22 September 2011); Wright v Western Australia
(2010) 43 WAR 1; Oubid v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 79 (21 March 2013).
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be available) in many criminal justice decision-making contexts. We consider this
matter further below.46

B Victim Intoxication in Sexual Assault Cases
While the most common focus of Australian criminal law is accused/offender
intoxication, victim intoxication also features prominently, particularly in the
context of sexual offences. Our data-set contained a number of instances where
the court was concerned with the significance of the victim’s intoxication. The
vast majority of these were sexual assault or indecent assault matters and included
28 instances where the credibility and/or reliability of the victim was considered.
We note that no other offence category revealed such a pattern of concern for
the credibility/reliability implications of the victim’s intoxication. In addition,
there were 19 instances where victim intoxication was considered in relation to
proof of non-consent, and 21 instances where the court considered whether the
victim’s intoxication (and, therefore, vulnerability), was an aggravating factor at
sentencing.
In the discussion that follows, we draw attention to three issues where we
detected considerable variation in how courts approach evidence of complainant
intoxication:
(i)

assessments of the credibility,47 and reliability,48 of the complainant’s
evidence;

(ii)

proof of non-consent; and

(iii) proof of the offender’s knowledge of non-consent.
On the question of credibility and reliability, there is consistent recognition
that intoxication is relevant. This finding was anticipated. More surprising was
the finding of considerable variation in how courts characterised the effect of
intoxication on credibility/reliability. Some decisions reflect the view that
intoxication will necessarily diminish the reliability of a complainant’s evidence.49
By contrast, in others, courts have taken the position that the complainant’s
intoxication may render her/his account more reliable, by offering an explanation
other than dishonesty for gaps in the complainant’s recall or inconsistencies

46
47
48

49

See Quilter et al, ‘Criminal Law and the Effects of Alcohol and Other Drugs’, above n 7; Quilter and
McNamara, above n 19.
The cases in our data-set were concerned with qualitative assessments of a complainant’s credibility,
rather than technical applications of the rules governing the admissibility of credibility evidence (eg
pt 3.7 of the Uniform Evidence Act).
Although s 165 of the Uniform Evidence Act, dealing with unreliable evidence and warnings to the
jury, makes no express reference to intoxication or AOD effects, s 165(1)(c) is sufficiently broad in
its terms (‘evidence the reliability of which may be affected by age, ill health (whether physical or
mental), injury or the like’) as to include intoxication. See, eg, R v Moffatt [No 3] [1999] NSWSC 233
(26 March 1999) [80].
See, eg, Roberts v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 452, [52]; Cook v Western Australia [2010]
WASCA 241 (22 December 2010) [68]; R v Daniel (2010) 207 A Crim R 449, [50].
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in her/his account of events, thereby strengthening the prosecution case.50 The
variations to which we are drawing attention here are not simply attributable to
case-to-case factual differences, but appear to be the result of different judicial
conceptions of how alcohol and other drugs may impact on perception and
recall of events. Two decisions of the South Australia Court of Criminal Appeal
illustrate the contrast.
In R v Daniel,51 the Court upheld an appeal against a conviction for rape. One of
the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury on
the relevance of the complainant’s intoxication. Justice Sulan stated:
In my view, the direction failed to adequately instruct the jury that, in considering
the reliability of the complainant’s evidence, and whether they could be satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant’s guilt upon her evidence, her state of
intoxication was relevant. It was relevant to her perception, and to her recall of the
events. It was also relevant, when considering her credibility.
In restricting his direction to the question of whether the complainant might
have lost her inhibitions, but has now forgotten, or is now unwilling to admit her
conduct, the trial judge failed to give a sufficient direction about the relevance of
the complainant’s state of intoxication.52

In R v Compton,53 the Court considered appeals against convictions for the rape of
a 14-year-old boy. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that the convictions
were unsafe and unsatisfactory given factors said to diminish the complainant’s
reliability and credibility, including his intoxication.54 Justice Stanley said:
In my view, the issues surrounding the reliability of the complainant’s evidence
were not sufficient to preclude satisfaction of the appellants’ guilt to the requisite
standard. They were matters to be considered in assessing whether the charges
had been proved to the requisite standard, but did not per se, preclude a finding of
guilt. Further, the inconsistencies identified on the evidence could all be explained
by the complainant’s youth, intoxication at the time, sense of shame, his fear of
not being believed, and the nature of the ordeal he had endured as a teenage boy
of 14 years of age.55

On the question of proof of non-consent, most Australian jurisdictions have
enacted provisions which expressly identify victim intoxication as a condition
that vitiates or may vitiate consent.56 Such provisions recognise that in some
circumstances a complainant may not have the capacity to freely and voluntarily
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

See, eg, R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177, [159]–[162]; Bray v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 623;
R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123 (10 June 2011) [18].
(2010) 207 A Crim R 449.
Ibid [50]–[51].
R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177.
The appeals were upheld on another ground.
R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177, [162] (emphasis added).
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(6)(a); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 34C(2)(e); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)
s 67(1)(e); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 2A(2)(h); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(2)(c); Criminal
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 46(3)(d). No such provisions have been enacted in Queensland or
Western Australia; however, as will be discussed here, it is not obvious that complainant intoxication
evidence has a markedly different impact on the conduct of rape trials in these states.
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consent due to her/his intoxicated state. They may also be said to operate to
address a range of stereotypes including those of jurors, demonstrated in mock
jury studies, in which jurors are more likely to attribute greater responsibility
and blameworthiness to complainants who are intoxicated.57 In relation to the
offender’s knowledge of non-consent, each Australian jurisdiction has imposed
either complete or partial limits on whether offender intoxication can be taken
into account either as a result of either specific provisions governing the mens rea
for sexual assault,58 or general rules which exclude the intoxication ‘defence’59 in
cases of ‘general intent’ crimes (a category that includes sexual assault).60
On the implications of victim intoxication for proof of non-consent and the
accused’s knowledge of non-consent, we detected a degree of divergence in attitude
and approach in the cases in our data-set. Certainly, in some cases, the judicial
approach seemed to reflect the policy reflected in the statutory provisions just
mentioned.61 For example, in Still v The Queen,62 the complainant’s intoxication
was seen as supporting the Crown’s ability to prove non-consent:
The complainant was heavily affected by alcohol, incoherent in her speech shortly
before entering the taxi and probably bordering upon being comatose. These were
significant aspects bearing upon the giving of consent to sexual activity with the
Appellant, who was a complete stranger.63

However, surprisingly, and sometimes despite the legislative provisions that are
underpinned by a contrary policy purpose,64 some cases appeared to validate
the position that a person can be both extremely intoxicated and nonetheless
consenting to sexual intercourse, even in the face of her/his claim that s/he was
not consenting. In Mitic v The Queen the Victorian Court of Appeal endorsed
the following passage from the Queensland Court of Appeal’s decision in R v
Francis:
It is not correct as a matter of law that it is rape to have [sexual intercourse with]
a woman who is drunk who does not resist because her submission is due to the
fact that she is drunk. The reason why it is not is that that at least includes the
case where the [intercourse] is consensual notwithstanding that the consent is
induced by excessive consumption of alcohol. The critical question in this case
57

58
59

60
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See, eg, Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases
Involving Intoxicants: The Findings of a Pilot Study’ (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 25.
Studies have also found that police and prosecutorial discretion are likely to be exercised against
proceeding where the complainant has been drinking or using drugs: Statewide Steering Committee
to Reduce Sexual Assault, ‘Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000–2003’ (Summary Research
Report, Office of Women’s Policy, Department for Victorian Communities, July 2006) [119].
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(3)(e); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 37H(1)(a).
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 11A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) pt 8; Criminal Code Act
1899 (Qld) s 28; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT)
ch 2 pt 2.3 div 2.3.3; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) pt IIAA div 3 sub-div 2; Criminal Code Act 1924
(Tas) s 17; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.3 div 8.
On the specific/general intent distinction, see above n 4.
See, eg, R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010) [23]; Still v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 131 (23
June 2010); Singh v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 262 (11 December 2012).
[2010] NSWCCA 131 (23 June 2010).
Ibid [66].
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(3)(e); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 37H(1)(a).
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was whether the complainant had, by reason of sleep or a drunken stupor, been
rendered incapable of deciding whether to consent or not.65

Such an approach is also reflected in the recommended direction in the New South
Wales Criminal Court Bench Book:
In considering whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt that
[the complainant] did not consent you may have regard to the following matters if
you have found them proved on the evidence before you:
[T]hat the complainant had sexual intercourse while substantially intoxicated by
alcohol or any drug …
It does not follow simply because you find that fact proved that you should be
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, but it is a
relevant fact that you should consider in deciding whether the Crown has proved
this element [non-consent] of the offence as it must do so before you can convict
the accused.
If the Crown fails to prove that the complainant was not consenting, the accused
is “not guilty” of this charge.66

It is clear, then, that the statutory guidance that is offered in most Australian
jurisdictions has not produced a consistent practice of treating complainant
intoxication as synonymous with the absence of consent. It might be said that this
is unsurprising given the qualified language of relevant legislative provisions. For
example, s 61HA(6)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) states that ‘[t]he grounds on
which it may be established that a person does not consent to sexual intercourse
include: (a) if the person has sexual intercourse while substantially intoxicated
by alcohol or any drug’.67 If a person who is ‘substantially intoxicated’ (we will
return directly to the question of what this phrase means) can nonetheless be
found to have consented, it is appropriate to ask whether such provisions have any
effect on the conduct of a sexual assault trial or the nature of the inquiries therein.
There may be said to be symbolic and educational benefits in such legislation
— for judges, juries and the wider community. However, the manner in which
they have been drafted and interpreted means that the central inquiry in rape/
sexual assault trials is whether the Crown has established an absence of ‘free
and voluntary’ consent or agreement.68 It is not obvious that the Crown derives
any significant benefit from statutory provisions that address victim intoxication.
65
66
67

68

R v Francis [1993] 2 Qd R 300, 305, cited in Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011)
[24]; See also Jones v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 117 (4 June 2010).
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, ‘Criminal Trial Courts Bench Book’ (Bench Book,
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, October 2002) [5–1566] <https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.
au/publications/benchbks/criminal/sexual_intercourse_without_consent.html#p5-1566>.
(Emphasis added). Note that this provision that provides that intoxication ‘may’ vitiate consent can
be contrasted with the unequivocal language of s 61HA(4)(b) dealing with a complainant who is
unconscious or asleep: ‘A person does not consent to sexual intercourse … if the person does not
have the opportunity to consent to the sexual intercourse because the person is unconscious or asleep’
(emphasis added).
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(2); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 34C(1); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)
s 67(1); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 2A(1); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 192(1); Criminal Law
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 46(2); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 348(1); Criminal Code Act
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 319(2)(a).
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Indeed, to the extent that they encourage complainant candour and disclosure
about their intoxication — on the basis that this evidence will assist in proving at
least one element of the prosecution case (i.e. non-consent) — such evidence also
has the potential to weaken the Crown case by providing the defence with a basis
on which to impugn the complainant’s reliability or credibility. This is one of the
ways in which evidence of complainant intoxication may be said to be a doubleedged sword in sexual assault cases. We expand on this characterisation below.
One of the further findings of our case analysis relates to the failure to define the
state of intoxication required to ‘trigger’ provisions such as those contained in
s 61HA(6)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (consent may be negated where the
person is ‘substantially intoxicated by alcohol or drugs’). There is no definition
of ‘intoxicated’ — let alone ‘substantially intoxicated’ — for the purposes of this
section. In the cases reviewed, the available evidence of the victim’s intoxication
was often limited. It was rare for a BAC reading or expert evidence on the likely
effects of AOD consumption to be available. Intoxication evidence often took the
form of the victim’s self-report on how much s/he had consumed and/or how s/he
recalled feeling at the time of the offence.
Understandably, sexual assault victims often used imprecise colloquial language
to convey their degree of intoxication. The following examples are illustrative:69
• ‘pretty drunk’;70
• ‘starting to feel out of it’, ‘never felt that drunk before in [her] life’;71
• ‘when asked to describe how intoxicated she was on a scale of 1 to 10, she
described herself as being a 10’;72
• ‘She described herself as being “quite merry”, but not so much so as to have
an impaired memory of what happened’;73
• ‘She said at this stage she was still “very drunk” and on a scale of one to ten
she estimated she was at about eight to nine’;74
• ‘In evidence she said that, by this time, she had drunk between five and eight
cans of a mixed alcohol drink and was “a bit drunk”’;75
• ‘ pretty drunk’, ‘definitely tipsy drunk’, ‘extremely drunk’;76
• ‘very stoned’ [marijuana];77

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See also Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
Roberts v The Queen (2012) 226 A Crim R 452, [6].
Amato v The Queen [2013] VSCA 346 (3 December 2013) [22].
R v Almotared [2011] QCA 128 (17 June 2011) [11].
R v O’Loughlin [2011] QCA 123 (10 June 2011) [3].
Jones v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 117 (4 June 2010) [16].
DPP (Vic) v Werry (2012) 37 VR 524, 527 [9].
R v McGuire [2013] QCA 290 (4 October 2013) [2]–[3], [6].
R v Elomari [2012] QCA 27 (28 February 2012) [5].
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• ‘ When asked to describe how intoxicated she was out of 10, she replied
“nine”’;78
• ‘ I was very drunk and tired’.79
Given the imprecise and subjective colloquial nature of these expressions to
describe both the presence and extent of intoxication, a significant issue arises as
to how such terms and descriptions are translated into legal significance, so as
to contribute to the resolution of important questions such as consent, reliability
and credibility.
Elsewhere,80 employing a theoretical framework drawn from the work of Mariana
Valverde,81 and Arlie Loughnan,82 we have argued that juries are frequently
directed by judges (and legal practitioners) to draw on ‘common knowledge’ or
‘lay knowledge’ about AOD in order to give meaning to the legal concept of
intoxication. We have questioned whether this is an appropriate foundation for
making decisions about complex cognitive functions of the sort that tribunals
are regularly required to make — like intention formation where the accused
was intoxicated at the time of the commission of a serious violent crime, or,
for present purposes, like the giving of consent to sexual intercourse where the
complainant was intoxicated.
In the context of sexual assault trials where consent is in issue, an additional
reason why self-reporting and lay conceptions of intoxication are operative and
influential is that there may be a gap between what is understood about the effects
of alcohol and other drugs — even by scientific experts — and the question to be
answered regarding consent. The point is illustrated by one of the rare cases in
our data-set in which there was ‘objective’ evidence of the complainant’s level of
intoxication:83
The highest the remaining evidence went was that the complainant was significantly
drunk at the time of intercourse, possibly with a blood-alcohol concentration as
high as between 0.165% and .2%, and stumbling and repeating her speech. But, as
Dr Odell said, he could not venture an opinion as to whether that had deprived the
complainant of the capacity to consent.84

It is clear that, despite decades of well-intentioned progressive statutory law
reform (including on the relevance to be attached to intoxication),85 evidence of
victim intoxication can (still) be a double-edged sword in sexual assault cases.
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O’Rafferty v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 35 (21 August 2014) [16].
Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
Mariana Valverde, Law’s Dream of a Common Knowledge (Princeton University Press, 2003).
Arlie Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press,
2012).
Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011).
Ibid [24].
Kathleen Daly and Brigitte Bouhours, ‘Rape and Attrition in the Legal Process: A Comparative
Analysis of Five Countries’ (2010) 39 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 565; Julia Quilter,
‘Re-Framing the Rape Trial: Insights from Critical Theory About the Limitations of Legislative
Reform’ (2011) 35 Australian Feminist Law Journal 23.
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On the one hand, legislative provisions expressly identify intoxication as a factor
that may suggest the absence of consent, and as evidence which may support
the Crown’s case. On the other hand, the same evidence can be relied upon by
the defence in a number of ways: to raise doubt about the victim’s reliability and
credibility, or in support of an assertion that the accused honestly and reasonably
believed that the complainant was consenting.
The challenges associated with the justice system’s approach to victim
intoxication need to be addressed sensitively. The inappropriateness of being
overly proscriptive and imposing on victims of sexual assault a ‘test’ of
intoxication that they must ‘pass’ is obvious. The conundrum to which we have
drawn attention cannot be resolved merely by offering a statutory definition of
intoxication (however much drafters aim for context-sensitivity); but the status
quo, where victim intoxication is often evidenced via self-report, articulated in
(value-laden) lay terms and filtered by the attitudes of judges and juries, leaves
victims unduly vulnerable to adverse judgment.86 Related to the more general
point that relying on ‘common knowledge’ to define intoxication for criminal law
purposes is problematic,87 here we emphasise that resort to ‘what we all know’
is especially problematic in sexual assault trials, given the long and entrenched
history of stereotypes about rape complainants.88

C   The Intoxication ‘Defence’89
The most familiar way in which intoxication evidence can be raised in relation
to criminal responsibility, which has been well examined in the textbooks and
the scholarly literature,90 is where the evidence is relied on by an accused for the
purpose of disputing the Crown’s ability to prove a core element of the offence
(eg intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm on a charge of murder). In all
Australian jurisdictions,91 apart from Victoria,92 this option has been limited93 to
86

87
88
89

90
91

92
93

Emily Finch and Vanessa E Munro, ‘Intoxicated Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-assisted Rape’
[2003] Criminal Law Review 773; Finch and Munro, above n 57; Andrea Flynn and Kathryn Graham,
‘“Why Did It Happen?” A Review and Conceptual Framework for Research on Perpetrators’ and
Victims’ Explanations for Intimate Partner Violence’ (2010) 15 Aggression and Violent Behavior 239.
Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
See Julia Quilter, ‘From Raptus to Rape: A History of the “Requirements” of Resistance and Injury’
(2015) 2 Law & History 89; Quilter, ‘Re-Framing the Rape Trial’, above n 85.
We have made no attempt to estimate the frequency with which intoxication evidence is employed
as part of a defence strategy (or the success rate of such approaches) because our data-set could
not support such analysis (noting that a defendant who has successfully relied on an intoxication
‘defence’ at trial is relatively unlikely to be appealing to a higher court).
See above n 2–3.
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 11A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) pt 8; Criminal Code
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 28; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28; Criminal Code Act
2002 (ACT) pt 2.3 div 2.3.3; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) pt IIAA div 3 sub-div 2; Criminal Code
Act 1924 (Tas) s 17; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) pt 2.3 div 8.
R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Criminal Liability
for Self-Induced Intoxication, Report (May 1999).
These restrictions do not apply to ‘involuntary’ intoxication (see generally, Bronitt and McSherry,
above n 3, 299–300) which, as our current data-set confirms, feature very rarely in the decided cases.
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crimes that have a specific intent component — i.e. where the offence definition
requires the Crown to prove as an element of the offence that the accused intended
to bring about a particular consequence.94 While these rules are colloquially
referred to as the intoxication ‘defence’, it is appropriate to note that, even if
successful, such reliance on intoxication evidence is likely to result in conviction
for a lesser (general intent) crime, rather than acquittal.95
One of the insights supported by the cases in our data-set is that this familiar
context is only one of several ways in which intoxication evidence may impact
on assessments of criminal responsibility. Moreover, contrary to the views that
circulate periodically in media accounts and political discourse,96 intoxication
evidence is as likely to increase the prospect of a conviction as to provide the
accused with a basis for ‘getting off’. We will elaborate on the strategic risk posed
by reliance on intoxication evidence in the discussion that follows.
The diversity we have found includes where intoxication is:
•

a sserted as relevant to whether the accused had another form of subjective
mens rea — such as awareness of what a joint enterprise participant was doing
or intending;97

•

a sserted by a defendant to support the subjective test component of another
defence, such as provocation,98 self-defence,99 or mistake of fact;100

•

c ounter-intuitively, asserted by the Crown to strengthen (not weaken) the
prosecution’s assertion that the defendant acted with the requisite intent;101 and

94

The distinction was endorsed by the House of Lords in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, and although
it was rejected by the High Court of Australia in R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, legislatures
have modified the Australian common law position. The veracity of the general intent/specific
intent distinction as an appropriate basis for determining the availability of exculpatory intoxication
evidence has been questioned: see, eg, Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, Intoxication and Criminal
Responsibility, Final Report No 7 (August 2006) 46; above n 4.
95 See, eg, R v Harold [2010] QCA 267 (8 October 2010).
96 See, eg, Bronnit and McSherry, above n 3, 285–6; Brown, above n 24, 217–22.
97 See, eg, Ulutui v The Queen (2014) 41 VR 676; R v Heyward & Minter [2010] SASCFC 38 (28
September 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
98 See, eg, R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320.
99 See, eg, Dal Cortivo v The Queen (2010) 204 A Crim R 55.
100 See, eg, Commissioner of Police v Stehbens [2013] QCA 81 (16 April 2013); Prazmo v Western
Australia [No 2] [2010] WASCA 99 (25 May 2010).
101 See, eg, in Ward v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013) [82], the trial judge directed the
jury that: ‘You can have an intoxicated intention. You can have an intention that is based on alcohol
and drugs. In fact, very often, unfortunately, the situation is that a person forms a certain intention
because they are intoxicated and they would no [sic] not have formed it if they were not.’ See also R v
Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
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asserted by the Crown to foreclose access to a defence (noting that legislation
defining some defences expressly excludes reliance on intoxication
evidence102).103

It is important to recognise that the accused does not control whether intoxication
is in issue. Trial judges have an obligation to put intoxication evidence to the
jury even if not asserted by the defendant if the judge considers that there is
sufficient evidence that intoxication may be relevant to a matter that goes to the
guilty/not guilty decision.104 This may be an outcome that a defendant has actively
attempted to avoid for strategic reasons, such as inconsistency with their main
line of defence (eg diminished responsibility/substantial impairment or ‘insanity’/
mental illness)105 or out of a concern that they may be judged harshly because of
the stigma associated with excessive alcohol consumption (or the consumption of
illicit drugs) or regarded as unreliable or lacking in credibility.
The cases in our data-set show that an accused faces a significant ‘strategic risk’
if evidence of her/his intoxication is before the court. This matter has been the
subject of judicial comment,106 and an influence on defence practice, but it has
rarely been discussed or documented in the literature.107 One common form
of strategic risk we identified in the cases we reviewed is illustrated by the
Queensland case of Stehbens,108 in which the accused was charged with assaulting
a police officer. She gave evidence of her intoxication to support her defence of
mistake under s 24 of the Criminal Code (Qld): that is, that she did not realise the
person she hit was a police officer. She was convicted at first instance, appealed
successfully to the District Court, but this decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeal and the conviction restored. The Court endorsed the Magistrate’s adverse
assessment of the defendant’s reliability given her ‘alcohol consumption and her
admitted state of mind at the time the alleged offence took place’.109

102 In some jurisdictions, legislation provides that an accused person is precluded from relying on certain
defences if they were intoxicated at the time of the alleged commission of the offence: eg, the defence
of insanity in the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 28 and the Criminal Code Act 1899
(Qld) s 28, the partial defence of extreme provocation in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 23 and the
partial defence of diminished responsibility in Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 159(3).
103 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297; MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305, 309 [16]; R v Stanley [2013]
NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013); R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014).
104 See, eg, SW v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 103 (7 June 2013); R v George [2014] 2 QD R 150; R v
Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010); Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31.
105 Ibid. The case of R v Logan [2012] QCA 210 (17 August 2012) is illustrative. The accused sought to
play down his level of intoxication in a context where he sought to rely on the defence of insanity
(Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 27) or the partial defence of diminished responsibility (Criminal
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 304A). After initially indicating that he was intoxicated at the time of the
conduct in question, he later resiled (‘probably [became] aware that it would not be helpful’ ([73])).
By contrast, the prosecution drew attention to the accused’s alleged intoxication and asserted that he
had ‘killed in an intoxicated frenzy’ ([2]).
106 R v Ainsworth (1994) 76 A Crim R 127, 138 (Gleeson CJ).
107 The matter is discussed briefly in Brown et al, above n 24, 881; and Colvin et al, above n 3, 444.
108 Commissioner of Police v Stehbens [2013] QCA 81 (16 April 2013).
109 Ibid [43].
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The South Australian case of Stott provides a further illustration.110 The Full Court
ruled that the trial judge had been correct to direct the jury that the accused’s
intoxication was simultaneously relevant to the question of whether the accused
foresaw the risk associated with his driving behaviour and his credibility and
reliability as a witness. The trial judge’s direction is worth extracting at some
length to make the point:
Mr Stott’s intoxication, if you find that he was intoxicated, may affect your
deliberations in a number of ways. … His intoxication is relevant in considering
whether he had the intention which I have told you is an ingredient of the various
charges, or whether he was reckless in the way that I have explained to you. The
inferences about intention and recklessness which may be drawn in the case of
a sober person from his actions may not be as readily drawn in the case of an
intoxicated person. … So when you are considering with what intention or state
of mind the accused acted, you will bear in mind the effect, if any, of the influence
of alcohol upon his mind. As I have mentioned, you will bear in mind intoxication
when considering both intention and recklessness. ... Mr Stott’s intoxication at the
time may also affect your estimate of his credibility and reliability as a witness
here in the witness box. It may also affect your assessment of the accuracy of his
perception at the time the events were occurring.111

In a further and more surprising twist on the notion of intoxication-as-strategic
risk (that is, surprising when compared with the popular conception of the socalled ‘drunk’s defence’), we identified a number of cases in our data-set in which
trial judges and appellate courts endorsed the Crown’s adoption of an approach
which relied on evidence of the accused’s intoxication to strengthen (not weaken)
the assertion that the Defendant acted with the requisite intent.112 The case of Ward
was the most striking example.113 The trial judge (whose approach was approved
of by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal) effectively turned the
intoxication ‘defence’ on its head by suggesting that the accused’s (multi-drug)
intoxication could actually assist the jury to conclude that she had the requisite
intent (when she ran the victim down with her car). Howie J said:
You can have an intoxicated intention. You can have an intention that is based on
alcohol and drugs. In fact, very often, unfortunately, the situation is that a person
forms a certain intention because they are intoxicated and they would no [sic] not
have formed it if they were not. …
You have a specific intention to do something, even though you are intoxicated.
That may be the reason why you have that intention. You have heard some
evidence about the disinhibiting effect of alcohol. How sometimes people will do

110 R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346.
111 Ibid 353–4 [20].
112 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297; MG v The Queen (2010) 29 VR 305, 309 [16]; Ward v The
Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013); R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014).
113 Ward v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 46 (1 March 2013).
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things, form intentions, carry out actions they wouldn’t do if they were stone cold
and so on.114

A variation on this approach was evident in Hothnyang.115 The Victorian Court
of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s distinction between: intoxication that makes
a person unable to form intent; and intoxication that disinhibits a person, and
makes him/her ‘unable to resist the temptation to [intentionally] kill or inflict
really serious injury’.116
Another variation was apparent in Stanley,117 a case in which the question of
whether the accused’s intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about whether he
had the requisite specific intent. The Crown ‘conceded’ that the events in question
(including the criminal offending) would not have happened but for the accused’s
intoxication, but this was a concession designed to strengthen the prosecution
case. The trial judge endorsed the Crown’s theory of intoxication’s causal role
and observed that ‘specific intent can sometimes be formed by people who are in
a terrible state of intoxication or whatever’.118
It is not our contention that there is anything inappropriate about the Crown’s
strategic enlistment of intoxication evidence to support a conviction. However,
the practice does provide a further illustration of one of our central arguments in
this article: the relationship between evidence of AOD consumption and effects,
criminal trial processes and the determination of criminal responsibility is much
more complex than is commonly recognised in both the scholarly literature and
the political discourse that frequently surrounds intoxication-focused criminal
law reform proposals and debates. An important dimension of this complexity
is the absence of any meaningful guidelines — legislative or judicial — on the
point at which a person’s level of intoxication will be considered so high as to
support a conclusion that there was reasonable doubt about whether she acted
with a requisite specific intent. The cases in our data-set suggest that juries are
regularly asked to make this complex assessment on the basis of their ‘common
knowledge’ about AOD effects.119
It is appropriate to acknowledge that the Crown does not always ‘exploit’ the
accused’s intoxication to achieve conviction. It is apparent that prosecutors will
sometimes take intoxication into account in the plea negotiation process. For
114 Ibid [82], [84]. See also R v Barden [2010] QCA 374 (23 December 2010) [7], where the trial judge
told the jury that ‘[a] drunken intention is still an intention. If he had drunkenly formed the intention
to do grievous bodily harm he is guilty of murder’; and Mulkatana v The Queen (2010) 28 NTLR 31,
40–1 [44] (‘drunken intention’).
115 Hothnyang v The Queen [2014] VSCA 64 (11 April 2014).
116 Ibid [45]. See also R v Humbles [2014] SASCFC 91 (13 August 2014) [32] where the Crown
emphasised the impulsivity/disinhibition effects of the accused’s intoxication as a result of alcohol
and methylamphetamine consumption.
117 R v Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013).
118 Ibid [17].
119 See, eg, R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346, 353–4 [20]; Shepherd v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 245 (17
November 2011) [192]; R v Stanley [2013] NSWCCA 124 (28 May 2013) [60]; Babic v The Queen
(2010) 28 VR 297, 320–1 [106]. The implications of reliance on ‘common knowledge’ as the reference
point for understanding and applying the concept of intoxication as it relates to criminal responsibility
are discussed more fully in Quilter and McNamara, above n 19.
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example, in West,120 the defendant’s intoxication (and the challenge this posed
for the Crown’s ability to prove the requisite intent beyond reasonable doubt)
was identified by the Victorian Court of Appeal as a determinative factor in the
Crown’s decision to accept pleas to recklessly causing serious injury (rather than
intentionally causing serious injury).121

D  Sentencing122
The High Court has held that sentencing should be approached as a process of
‘intuitive’ or ‘instinctive’ synthesis123 — language which is designed to convey
that sentencing is a human (and not mechanical) decision-making process that
must take account of all of the myriad factors that are relevant. It is a process
which involves:
the exercise of a discretion controlled by judicial practice, appellate review,
legislative indicators and public opinion. Statute, legal principle and community
values all confine the scope in which instinct may operate.124

In addition to the common law sentencing principles and purposes of punishment
which have developed over time,125 legislatures in several jurisdictions have
enacted statutory formulations of sentencing purposes and principles,126
whether expressed as ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ factors,127 or relevant
‘considerations’.128
NSW and Queensland are the only Australian jurisdictions in which (since 2014)
courts have been given legislative guidance on the relevance of intoxication to
sentencing — in the form of express statements that self-induced intoxication
120 West v The Queen [2014] VSCA 36 (13 March 2014).
121 Ibid [31].
122 We have not set out to complete a fine-grained comparative study of Australia’s different sentencing
regimes. We will focus on general patterns and commonalities when it comes to rules, principles and
practices on the relevance of intoxication to sentencing, while also drawing attention to noteworthy
variations and departures.
123 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357. For a critique of this approach to sentencing, see Mirko
Bagaric and Richard Edney, Sentencing in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2016) 29–31.
124 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, 390 [84].
125 Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571; Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; York v The Queen (2005)
225 CLR 466; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164
CLR 465; R v Jackway; Ex parte Attorney-General [1997] 2 Qd R 277; R v Leach (1979) 1 A Crim R
320; R v Morris (1958) 76 WN (NSW) 40; R v Radich [1954] NZLR 86; R v Ball (1951) 35 Cr App Rep
164; R v McCowan [1931] St R Qd 149.
126 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1); Criminal Law
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(2); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure)
Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 7; Sentencing Act (NT) s 5.
127 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A; Sentencing Act (NT) s 6A; Sentencing Act
1995 (WA) ss 7–8. Even in states where no comparable provisions have been enacted the courts
recognise and apply aggravating and mitigating factors: see, eg, Daley v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA
10 (22 August 2016); Ashdown v The Queen (2011) 37 VR 341; R v KU; Ex parte Attorney-General
(Qld) [No 2] [2011] 1 Qd R 439.
128 Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1); Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 33–6;
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2).
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is a not a mitigating factor.129 In all other jurisdictions, common law sentencing
principles inform the decision as to what significance, if any, should be attached
to offender intoxication.130
A strong undercurrent in recent debates about how the criminal law should be
reformed to better deter AOD-related violence131 is that the criminal justice
system, and the sentencing process in particular, has been too ‘soft’ on violence
associated with AOD consumption; that intoxication is too often treated as a
basis for reducing an offender’s sentence rather than increasing it. Our review of
sentencing appeal decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014 confirms that
this is an inaccurate and too simplistic an account of the principles and practices
that govern sentencing in cases where the accused was intoxicated. This finding
provides further support for the central thesis advanced in this article regarding
the complex relationship between intoxication and criminal court adjudication.
Not all Australian jurisdictions adopt the same starting point when it comes to
the relevance of offender intoxication to the determination of a sentence.132 For
example, in the Northern Territory, the Court of Criminal Appeal has observed
that:
The courts have pointed out that the intoxication of an offender through the
consumption of alcohol may constitute an aggravating factor or a mitigating factor
depending upon the circumstances of the case. There is no general rule that such
intoxication need be one or the other. In some circumstances it may be a neutral
factor.133

By contrast, the starting point adopted by courts in some states is that there is a
‘general rule’ that intoxication per se does not operate as a mitigating factor.134 For,
example, in Hasan,135 the Victorian Court of Appeal asserted that: ‘courts around
Australia have consistently rejected the proposition that intoxication can mitigate
129 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(5AA), as amended by the Crimes and Other
Legislation Amendment (Assault and Intoxication) Act 2014 (NSW); Penalties and Sentences Act
1992 (Qld) s 9(9A), as amended by the Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 (Qld). Note
that the cases in our date set were decided before these provisions came into force.
130 See generally, Bagaric and Edney, above n 123, 372–7.
131 A 2016 Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee Inquiry into the
need for a nationally-consistent approach to alcohol-fuelled violence was asked to investigate inter
alia, ‘whether a judicial commission in each state and territory would ensure consistency in judgments
relating to alcohol-related violence in line with community standards’: Parliament of Australia, Need
For a Nationally-Consistent Approach to Alcohol-Fuelled Violence, Parliament of Australia <http://
www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/
Alcohol_fuelled_violence>. In 2015 the New South Wales Sentencing Council was asked to consider
a proposal that intoxication be treated as a mandatory aggravating factor for crimes of violence. The
Council declined to endorse the proposal: New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Alcohol and Drug
Fuelled Violence’, above n 5, 12–13. See also New South Wales Sentencing Council, ‘Sentencing for
Alcohol-Related Violence’, above n 5.
132 Regarding recent changes in New South Wales and Queensland, see above n 129.
133 R v Wilson (2011) 30 NTLR 51, 62 [44]; see also Barron v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 114, 118–19 [17]
where the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal found that intoxication had not been overlooked by
the trial judge ‘in the plea [of] mitigation’.
134 See, eg, Western Australia v Hassell [2014] WASCA 158 (27 August 2014); Langdon v KelemeteLeoli-McLean (2011) 206 A Crim R 368.
135 Hasan v The Queen (2010) 31 VR 28.
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the seriousness of an offence or reduce the offender’s culpability’.136 Similarly
in Hart,137 the Court of Appeal of Queensland stated ‘[t]he Court has repeatedly
emphasized that intoxication cannot properly be regarded as a mitigating feature
in cases of violent crime’.138 There was also some evidence of intra-jurisdictional
variation during the periods under review. For example, in Stewart,139 the New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal (Button J) stated:
As for the role of alcohol, it is well established that the intoxication of an offender at
the time of the commission of an offence can be taken into account by a sentencing
court: see R v Coleman (1990) 47 A Crim R 306. Whether intoxication is a matter
of mitigation or aggravation will depend upon the facts of the particular case.140

In the same year, in GWM,141 a differently constituted New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal endorsed the approach in Hasan and stated that ‘voluntary
intoxication operates rarely (at best) to mitigate penalty’.142
It was not obvious that differences in starting point materially affected the way in
which intoxication evidence was treated in specific instances. Across the country
we identified four major circumstances in which intoxication is treated as an
‘indirect’143 mitigating factor:
1.

in support of characterisation of the offender’s conduct as ‘out of character’;

2.

in support of characterisation of the offender’s conduct as spontaneous/
unplanned;

3.

where the offender’s AOD use and intoxication on the occasion in question is
associated with dependency/addiction or other mental illness (or cognitive
impairment); and

4.

where the offender’s intoxication is located in a wider context of disadvantage,
specifically, Indigenous community disadvantage.

More tentatively, given the ambiguous language often used by courts, we would
add a fifth category: where intoxication is said to ‘explain’ (but not excuse) an
offence.144 We suggest that where a sentencing or appellate court uses language
that emphasises the role of intoxication in the offending behaviour (thereby
‘explaining’ the offence) there is an implied reduction in the offender’s culpability.
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Ibid 33 [21].
R v Hart [2012] QCA 38 (6 March 2012).
Ibid [42].
Stewart v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 183 (29 August 2012).
Ibid [51] (Button J).
R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 (21 November 2012).
Ibid [78] (Johnson J).
‘Indirectly’ is our characterisation of how intoxication is impacting on sentencing in these cases.
The effect is indirect to the extent that the courts are effectively asserting that intoxication per se is
not a mitigating factor, but evidence that the accused was intoxicated may allow him/her to access a
recognised mitigating factor (eg ‘out of character’ and ‘spontaneous/unplanned’).
144 See, eg, Bourke v The Queen (2010) 199 A Crim R 38; Stewart v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 185 (9
August 2013); R v Williams; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 250; R v Wilson
(2011) 30 NTLR 51; R v Taylor (2010) 203 A Crim R 302; Queensland Police Service v Terare (2014)
245 A Crim R 211; R v Williams [2014] ACTCA 30 (18 August 2014).
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The logic appears to be that the person would not have offended if s/he had been
sober, and that this is relevant to the determination of sentence. The following
comments by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Williams are illustrative:
Where, as here, the evidence, such as it was, suggested that the respondent had
used amphetamines for a limited period leading up to the offence and never
thereafter then two related things follow. One is that it can be said that the impact
of the drug explained the inexplicable — why a man with no previous conviction
for violence of any sort over twenty-three years of adult life should behave so
appallingly. Secondly, the prospect of the respondent re-offending is considerably
less than if he suffered from an uncontrollable psychological disturbance of some
kind.145

1   Mitigation: Out of Character
The starting point for understanding how intoxication can inform ‘out of character’
mitigation is that character has long been regarded as relevant to sentencing, and
‘good’ character is generally recognised as a mitigating factor, both at common
law,146 and in sentencing legislation.147 Although we detected a range of views
about the breadth of this category, there was widespread recognition in the cases
under review that one of the ways in which intoxication evidence can have a
mitigatory effect is if it supports the characterisation of the offender’s conduct
as ‘out of character’. The decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Simon is
illustrative:148
Alcohol, though not a circumstance of mitigation, seems likely to explain the
applicant’s behaviour on this occasion, which was quite out of character. Nothing
in the applicant’s antecedents, his relationship with the complainant and H, or
his minor criminal record, hinted that the applicant would offend in such a way;
or, in my opinion, carried any implication that he would be likely to do so in the
future.149

In the widely cited decision of Hasan the Victorian Court of Appeal, while
conceding that ‘[a]n “out of character” exception is acknowledged to exist’,
asserted ‘but it has almost never been applied’.150 Our review of appellate
decisions handed down in the period 2010–2014 suggests that this somewhat
understates the availability of this particular mode of intoxication-related indirect
mitigation. Although it did not feature in large numbers in our data-set, appellate
courts in three jurisdictions (including Victoria) recognised the out of character

145 R v Williams; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) (2014) 247 A Crim R 250, 268 [95]; see also R v Wilson
(2011) 30 NTLR 51, 61–2 [43]; R v Brown [2013] QCA 185 (16 July 2013) [11].
146 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465.
147 See, eg, Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6; Sentencing Act (NT) s 5; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW) s 21A(3)(f).
148 R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010).
149 Ibid [55].
150 Hasan v The Queen (2010) 31 VR 28, 33 [21]; see also R v GWM [2012] NSWCCA 240 (21 November
2012).
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exception and endorsed its application to mitigate sentence during the period
under review.151

2  Mitigation: Spontaneous/Unplanned
That an occasion of criminal offending was planned or pre-meditated is generally
regarded as an aggravating factor. This principle has been expressed in sentencing
legislation in some jurisdictions,152 and is recognised at common law.153 The
corollary is that a person who engages in ‘spontaneous’ criminal conduct is less
culpable and that this should be a factor that mitigates the sentence.154
Our data-set included a small number of cases in which appellate courts
recognised that evidence that the accused was intoxicated at the time may support
characterisation of the offence as spontaneous or unplanned, rather than planned
or pre-meditated. The case of R v YS is illustrative:155
Despite the objective gravity of the offending in this case, his Honour was
entitled to afford the respondent’s youth and immaturity considerable weight
in the assessment of a just and proportionate sentence. In addition, his Honour
made a further critical finding, namely that the respondent’s sexual offending was
impulsive. That finding is not under challenge on the appeal. In my view, that
finding, when coupled with the evidence which established that under intensive
psychological assessment the respondent was shown to have a compromised
capacity for reasoned judgment and empathy, an undeveloped capacity to control
his impulsive behaviour and a reduced capacity for mature decision-making (no
doubt aggravated by his state of intoxication at the time of the offending) was also
entitled to significant weight in this sentencing exercise.156

While this category of indirect intoxication-related mitigation is not limited to a
particular type of offence, we did note that a number of the cases in our sample
in which it was successfully invoked were sexual offences (including child sexual
assault).157 The number of cases in our sample is too small to support generalised
claims about sentencing patterns, but there appears to be an inconsistency that
151 See, eg, R v Simon [2010] VSCA 66 (31 March 2010); Johnson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 360 (14
November 2011); Chen v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 116 (22 May 2013); PDT v Western Australia
[2012] WASCA 134 (20 June 2012) [25]; Kaschull v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 245 (29
November 2012).
152 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(n).
153 Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 314. For recent applications, see, eg, Western Australia v
Malone [2015] WASCA 188 (16 September 2015) [76]; R v Ogilvie [2015] ACTSC 296 (9 September
2015) [31]; R v NQ [2013] QCA 402 (20 December 2013) [14]; R v M, AG (2013) 116 SASR 219, 226
[40].
154 See, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(3)(b).
155 [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014).
156 Ibid [99]; see also MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011) [65], [74]; BIP v The
Queen [2011] NSWCCA 224 (14 October 2011) [64]; Barron v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 114, 118–9
[17].
157 All of these cases were from New South Wales (noting that this State provided 28 per cent of the
cases in our total data-set): R v YS [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014); MDZ v The Queen [2011]
NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011); BIP v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 224 (14 October 2011); LB v
The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 220 (7 October 2011).
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warrants further investigation in future research. The possible inconsistency to
which we refer is between the suggestion that in the case of sexual offending
(which typically occurs in private settings) intoxicated-related spontaneity may
be mitigating, and the strong position articulated by the courts in recent years that
when it comes to ‘street’ violence (i.e. public non-sexual violence) intoxicatedrelated spontaneity should be treated as aggravating (discussed further below).

3   Mitigation: Mental Illness and Cognitive Impairment
That a person’s criminal offending occurred at a time when they were suffering
from a mental illness, or cognitive impairment,158 is generally considered to be
a mitigating factor, due to decreased moral culpability, and a reduced need for
general deterrence.159 Because intoxication per se is generally not a mitigating
factor, cases where both factors are present require the court to grapple with the
complex relationship between mental illness, AOD use and criminal offending. A
large number of the sentencing appeals in our data-set fall into this category. These
cases revealed judicial recognition of five different versions of the intoxication/
mental illness relationship:
(i)

A mental illness may have been exacerbated by AOD consumption;

(ii)

A mental illness may have contributed to AOD use;

(iii) AOD use may have triggered the mental illness;
(iv) AOD dependence may constitute the diagnosed mental illness (eg alcohol
use disorder); and
(v)

AOD use may be a form of ‘self-medication’ for coping with the symptoms
of a mental illness.

A range of mental illnesses were raised by the cases, including schizophrenia,
depressive disorder, anxiety, attention deficit disorder, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, drug dependence disorder, borderline and dependent

158 ‘Mental illness’ and ‘cognitive impairment’ are variously defined in a range of statutes relevant to
criminal justice administration across Australian jurisdictions. See generally New South Wales Law
Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in the Criminal Justice
System: Diversion, Report No 135 (2012). Debate surrounds current approaches in some contexts; see,
eg Arlie Loughnan, ‘Contemporary Comment: Reforming the Criminal Law on Mental Incapacity’
(2013) 25 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 703; Linda Steele, Leanne Dowse and Julian Trofimovs,
‘Who is Diverted?: Moving Beyond Diagnosed Impairment Towards a Social and Political Analysis
of Diversion’ (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 179. However, definitional complexities were not a
prominent feature of the sentencing cases in our data-set.
159 See, eg, R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; Lauritsen v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 442. Note, however,
that sometimes the nexus between an offender’s mental illness and criminal offending is regarded as
requiring the attribution of greater weight to specific deterrence and the need to protect the public:
See, eg, Beldon v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 194 (6 September 2012) [64].
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personality disorder.160 Evidence of cognitive impairment was also present in a
number of cases.161
A recurring message in the appellate decisions we reviewed was that, although
it is difficult to do so, the two factors of intoxication and mental illness must be
‘disentangled’.162 The relationship between intoxication and cognitive impairment
raised similar challenges.163 Although artificial in many respects (and perhaps
impossible), the driver for this exercise, as noted above, is that mental illness
and cognitive impairment are consistently regarded as mitigating factors whereas
intoxication is generally not regarded as mitigating.
It was evident from our analysis of the cases that judges struggle with the task of
separating the offender’s intoxication from her/his mental illness and determining
the role that each played in the offending behaviour. For example, in Adzioski v
The Queen (where the offender suffered from schizophrenia),164 the Court said:
While the level of the applicant’s intoxication might provide a complete answer
to the offending, his Honour regarded such a result as overly simplistic in that it
might artificially deny the presence of the underlying mental health condition. His
Honour concluded that the answer was likely to involve a synthesis of all of those
factors.165

A recurring ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge had placed too much
weight on mental illness rather than attribute the behaviour to intoxication (i.e. in
the context of a Crown appeal that the sentence was inadequate),166 or vice versa
(in the context of a defence appeal against severity).167 For example, in Bennett v
The Queen,168 the Victorian Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge had
attached too much significance to the offender’s alcohol use and intoxication and
not enough to his mental illness (chronic anxiety and depression).169 In R v Ball,170
160 See, eg, MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15 November 2011); George v The Queen [2013]
NSWCCA 263 (12 November 2013); Papas v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011).
161 See, eg, JM v The Queen (2012) 223 A Crim R 55; Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 (10
June 2011); Jacobs v The Queen [2011] VSCA 238 (18 August 2011); R v Lakin (2014) 118 SASR 535.
162 See, eg, R v Chandler [2012] NSWCCA 135 (28 June 2012) [56]–[59]; Papas v Western Australia
[2011] WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) [14]; R v van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90 (1 August 2012) [25]. It is
important to note that the task of assessing the relative significance of intoxication and mental illness
was undertaken not only in the sentencing context, but also in trials where the accused’s guilt was
being assessed: See, eg, Catley v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 249 (31 October 2014); Vulovic v The
Queen [2013] NSWCCA 340 (20 December 2013); R v Clough [No 2] [2011] 2 Qd R 222; R v Chenery
[2011] QCA 271 (7 October 2011); A-G (Qld) v Bosanquet [2012] QCA 367 (21 December 2012);
Namatjira v The Queen [2013] NTCCA 8 (19 July 2013); Goodridge v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA
37 (26 March 2014); R v Huni [2014] QCA 324 (5 December 2014).
163 See, eg, Reberger v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 132 (10 June 2011).
164 [2013] NSWCCA 69 (5 April 2013).
165 Ibid [35].
166 See, eg, DPP (Vic) v Sullivan [2014] VSCA 222 (17 September 2014) [51], [54]; DPP (Vic) v Edwards
(2012) 44 VR 114, 141 [126]–[128].
167 See, eg, R v van Setten [2012] SASCFC 90 (1 August 2012) [25]; Papas v Western Australia [2011]
WASCA 3 (10 January 2011) [14].
168 [2011] VSCA 253 (25 August 2011).
169 Ibid [62]–[66].
170 [2013] NSWCCA 126 (24 May 2013).
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the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that a history of alcohol
(and ‘Stilnox’) use was influential in the conclusion that there was little basis for
mitigation based on mental illness (depression).171
The task is especially complicated where the mental illness in question is a drug
dependence disorder, and the offender was intoxicated by the drug(s) in question
at the time of the offence.172

4   Mitigation: Indigenous Community Disadvantage
During the period under review the High Court of Australia handed down two
important decisions; Bugmy v The Queen,173 and Munda v Western Australia,174 that
clarify the circumstances under which intoxication associated with a background
of AOD-related disadvantage — such as has been recognised as occurring in
some Indigenous communities — may provide grounds for mitigation. The
decisions came more than two decades after the Supreme Court of New South
Wales decision in R v Fernando.175 In this case, Wood J outlined a set of principles
to guide the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders where community disadvantage
formed part of the background to the offending behaviour.176
In Bugmy, the High Court described the scope and relevance of Fernando as
follows:
The propositions stated in Fernando are largely directed to the significance of
the circumstance that the offender was intoxicated at the time of the offence. As
Wood J explained, drunkenness does not usually operate by way of excuse or to
mitigate an offender’s conduct. However, his Honour recognised that there are
Aboriginal communities in which alcohol abuse and alcohol-related violence go
hand in hand.177

The Court went on to hold that the relevant principles do not apply only to
Aboriginal offenders: ‘There is no warrant, in sentencing an Aboriginal
offender in New South Wales, to apply a method of analysis different from that
which applies in sentencing a non-Aboriginal offender.’178 In Munda the Court
counselled against an approach to intoxication-based mitigation which would
treat ‘Aboriginal offending … as less serious than offending by persons of other
171 Ibid [136].
172 See, eg, Carpenter v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 130 (30 May 2013) [22], where the Court observed:
‘Dr Nielssen diagnosed a substance abuse disorder based upon the applicant’s account of longstanding
cannabis use, binge drinking and frequent episodes of amnesia whilst under the effects of alcohol.
Despite accepting that the applicant’s state of intoxication contributed to the offending in the sense
that he was unlikely to have committed the offences if sober, his Honour was not satisfied that the
applicant’s substance abuse disorder mitigated the objective seriousness of his offending. This was
not subject to any challenge on the appeal’.
173 (2013) 249 CLR 571 (‘Bugmy’).
174 (2013) 249 CLR 600 (‘Munda’).
175 (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 (‘Fernando’).
176 Ibid 62–3.
177 Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571, 593 [38].
178 Ibid 592 [36].
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ethnicities’.179 In addition, the Court emphasised that ‘it would be wrong to accept
that a victim of violence by an Aboriginal offender is somehow less in need, or
deserving, of such protection and vindication as the criminal law can provide’.180
Technically, the relevant mitigating factor may apply whether or not the offender
was intoxicated at the time of the offence in question,181 but the majority of
the cases in which Fernando/Bugmy/Munda submissions are made involve an
intoxicated offender.
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Prince v The
Queen,182 decided after Bugmy and Munda, is illustrative:
The appellant reported exposure to cannabis at age 13 and to alcohol at age 14.
After his father’s death alcohol use increased to daily intake, to the point of
blacking out. While intoxicated he was involved in aggressive behaviour, fighting
with both strangers and family. In the community the longest period he had spent
alcohol free was one month. He did not experience difficulty abstaining while
in custody, but used alcohol to self medicate. His alcohol abuse led directly to
increased aggressive and criminal behaviour. …
The evidence of the appellant’s awful childhood experiences of violence and
drug and alcohol abuse, cast significant light on his ongoing problems with anger
management, violence and criminal conduct throughout his adult life, so as to
reduce his moral culpability for his inability to control himself.183

This case suggests that, even after Bugmy, it is accurate to identify the Indigenous
community disadvantage mode of AOD-related mitigation as one of the contexts
in which intoxication may have a mitigating effect on sentence.

5  Aggravation
In addition to those contexts in which legislation prescribes intoxication as
an aggravating factor,184 there are three circumstances in which courts treat
intoxication as an aggravating factor when sentencing an offender — two that
relate to offender intoxication and one that relates to victim intoxication.
First, offender intoxication may be regarded as an aggravating factor if the court
determines that s/he was ‘recklessly’ intoxicated; that is, the offender knew, based
on previous personal experience, that when s/he consumes alcohol (and/or other

179 Munda (2013) 249 CLR 600, 619 [53].
180 Ibid.
181 In Bugmy (2013) 249 CLR 571, the offender was not intoxicated at the time of the commission of the
offence.
182 [2013] NSWCCA 274 (18 November 2013).
183 Ibid [136], [150]. See also R v YS [2014] NSWCCA 226 (23 October 2014); R v Williams [2014] ACTCA
30 (18 August 2014) [7].
184 See, eg, dangerous operation of a vehicle while ‘adversely affected by an intoxicating substance’:
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 328A(2)(a). This phrase is also now used in ch 35A of the Criminal Code
1899 (Qld): See Quilter et al, The Definition and Significance of ‘Intoxication’ in Australian Criminal
Law, above n 6, 50.
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drugs) that s/he is at greater risk of offending or becoming violent.185 In Dosen v
The Queen,186 the Victorian Court of Appeal explained as follows: ‘[i]ntoxication
— whether by alcohol or drugs — can be a circumstance of aggravation where it
is shown that the offender had foreknowledge that, if he became intoxicated, he
was likely to behave as he did on the relevant occasion.’187 The rationale for this
approach is illustrated by the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v
John:188
The prosecutor responded that the notion of reduced moral culpability through
mental disease or illness was not applicable to someone who had notice almost
20 years ago that when he drinks he behaves violently. The appellant knew that his
self-induced intoxication could result in him behaving in a serious violent manner
towards others and yet he again drank to excess on this occasion.189

Although aggravation in such circumstances appears consonant with (subjective)
principles of criminal responsibility, it is not entirely clear what evidence needs
to be before the sentencing court before an offender can be regarded as having
been ‘recklessly’ intoxicated. Should there be evidence of previous offending?
Is evidence of previous (AOD-related) offending required? Or will evidence
of previous AOD abuse or addiction be sufficient? (If so, how are ‘abuse and
‘addiction’ defined?)190 Must it be shown that the offender had insight about the role
of AOD consumption in her/his criminal behaviour? Or is such a person ‘deemed’
to have such insight, by virtue of past offending while intoxicated? The relevance
of these questions is magnified further by the fact that, in the sentencing process,
unless they form part of agreed facts, the presence of aggravating factors must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt (whereas mitigating factors can be established
on the balance of probabilities).191
Secondly, offender intoxication may be an aggravating factor where the crime in
question takes the form of ‘random’ street violence. Without expressly naming
public intoxication as an aggravating factor, courts have indicated that such cases
give rise to a greater need for specific and general deterrence. For example, in R v
Levy; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld),192 the Queensland Court of Appeal said:

185 See, eg, Mendes v The Queen (2012) 221 A Crim R 161; MDZ v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 243 (15
November 2011); Gosland v The Queen [2013] VSCA 269 (24 September 2013); R v Lutze (2014) 121
SASR 144; Victor v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 94 (13 April 2011).
186 [2012] VSCA 307 (14 December 2012).
187 Ibid [18].
188 [2014] QCA 86 (24 April 2014).
189 Ibid [47]; see also Small v The Queen (2013) 231 A Crim R 279.
190 See generally Kate Seear and Suzanne Fraser, ‘Beyond Criminal Law: The Multiple Constitution of
Addiction in Australian Legislation’ (2014) 22 Addiction Research and Theory 438.
191 In Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47, 69 [64] the High Court summarised the law as follows:
‘a sentencing judge may not take facts into account in a way that is adverse to an offender unless those
facts have been established beyond reasonable doubt and, contrastingly, the offender bears the burden
of proving on the balance of probabilities matters which are submitted in his or her favour’, citing
R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270, 281 [25]–[27]. See also Anderson v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR
520, 539.
192 (2014) 244 A Crim R 296.
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In my view his Honour gave too little weight to the aspect of public deterrence.
Cases of this sort often involve young men who are intoxicated and seemingly
indifferent, at least at the time of their assault, to the consequences of what they
are doing. In many of the cases the assailants express remorse once they are sober
and the consequences are known. Many seem to have little in the way of criminal
history and inevitably, because of their youth, have some prospects of rehabilitation
and employment. But all of those matters cannot deny, in an appropriate case, the
need for public deterrence to be recognised by a term of actual imprisonment.193

Thirdly, victim intoxication may be regarded as an aggravating factor where it
increased her/his vulnerability, especially where there is evidence that the offender
exploited this vulnerability.194 The large majority of cases in which this mode of
intoxication-related aggravation was operative were sexual offence cases.195

V  CONCLUSION
Our original motivation for the project from which this article emanates was
a concern that recent policy debates and law reform proposals and initiatives,
particularly in relation to ‘alcohol-fuelled violence’,196 were not underpinned
by a sound appreciation of the complex status quo on the relationship between
intoxication and criminal law. Some of the insights offered in this article about
the complex and multiple effects of intoxication evidence in criminal cases may
already be familiar to criminal law practitioners through their experience in
trials and sentencing hearings, but they have never before been documented in
the scholarly literature. The focus in this article has been on the presentation
and analysis of original quantitative and qualitative data on how the concept of
‘intoxication’ is understood, and how it operates, in Australian criminal courts,
rather than the articulation of specific recommendations for law reform or policy
adjustment. However, consistent with our commitment to effective knowledge
transfer, we hope that the findings and analysis presented in this article can form
a constructive part of the evidence base for policy debates and future law reform
proposals, and can serve as a catalyst for wider scholarly interest in an aspect of
criminal law and justice administration that has been under-researched.

193 Ibid 313 [77]. See also Hards v The Queen [2013] VSCA 119 (7 May 2013); DPP (Tas) v Blackaby
[2013] TASCCA 4 (7 June 2013); O’Reilly v The Queen [2014] NTCCA 14 (24 September 2014); R v
Loveridge (2014) 243 A Crim R 31.
194 In some jurisdictions, sentencing legislation expressly treats as an aggravating factor circumstances
in which the offender causes the victim’s intoxication: see, eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act
1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(cb).
195 See, eg, R v Nabegeyo (2014) 34 NTLR 154; R v Lee [2012] QCA 239 (7 September 2012); R v Brace
[2011] SASCFC 54 (14 June 2011); R v Djordjevic [2012] SASCFC 69 (15 June 2012); Lim v Western
Australia [2010] WASCA 186 (23 September 2010); Miles v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 93 (18
May 2010); Western Australia v Staniforth-Smith [2014] WASCA 170 (5 September 2014); Prempeh v
Western Australia [2013] WASCA 150 (19 June 2013).
196 See Quilter, ‘One-Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-Fuelled” as an Aggravating
Factor’, above n 1.
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This article confirms that decisions about intoxication are made at multiple
points in the criminal justice system and the gross depiction of the criminal
justice system as excessively generous to intoxicated defendants is inaccurate.
Depending on the question to be answered, intoxication evidence may render it
more or less likely that the conduct in question will be characterised as criminal,
and, in the sentencing context, intoxication may serve to mitigate or aggravate
the sentence. The variation and nuance we have documented here may clash with
the dominant contemporary political narrative — that adverse moral judgment
should (always) attach to criminal offending associated with alcohol and drug use.
They are, however, a logical consequence of the complex relationship between
intoxication and the enforcement of the criminal law. Future policy debates and
law reform initiatives should recognise that there is no single characterisation that
can account for the multiple points at which intoxication may need to be assessed,
and the divergent ways in which it impacts on criminal case adjudication.
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